



Income Redistribution, Consumer Credit, and
Keeping Up with the Riches
In this study, we set up a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model with upward looking consumption comparison and show that con-
sumption externalities are an important driver of consumer credit dynam-
ics. Our model economy is populated by two different household types. In-
vestors, who hold the economy’s capital stock, own the firms and supply
credit, and workers, who supply labor and demand credit to finance con-
sumption. Furthermore, workers condition their consumption choice on the
investors’ level of consumption.We estimate themodel and find a significant
keeping up mechanism by matching business cycle statistics. In reproduc-
ing credit moments, our proposed model significantly outperforms a model
version in which we abstract from consumption externalities.
JEL codes: E21, E32, E44
Keywords: income redistribution, consumer credit, relative consumption
motive, business cycles
This study investigates the relevance of consumption
externalities between different income groups for replicating consumer credit dynam-
ics over the business cycle. For this purpose, we propose a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with upward looking consumption comparison that suc-
cessfully reproduces credit movements during the Great Moderation. We estimate
We thank the editor Sanjay K. Chugh and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and sug-
gestions. This paper has benefited greatly from comments made by participants at many conferences and
seminars, in particular from those of Ludger Linnemann, Roland Winkler, Wolfgang Leininger, Wolfram
Richter, Philip Jung, Johannes Brumm, Ken Judd, Stefan Wild, Michal Marenčák, Gregor von Schweinitz,
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deep model parameters and thereby contribute to the literature as we show that con-
sumption externalities are a significant determinant of short-run credit fluctuations.
Recent empirical studies show that consumption externalities significantly affect
individuals’ consumption decisions. Bertrand and Morse (2016) find empirical sup-
port for so-called “trickle-down consumption,” meaning that rising income and con-
sumption at the top of the income distribution induces households in the lower parts
of the distribution to consume a larger share of their income. Focusing on the pe-
riod between the early 1980s and 2008, the authors present evidence for a negative
relationship between income inequality and the savings rate of middle-income house-
holds. Carr and Jayadev (2015) show that rising indebtedness of U.S. households is
directly related to high levels of income inequality. The authors conclude that rela-
tive income concerns explain a significant part of the strong increase in household
debt for the period 1999–2009. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel,
Drechsel-Grau and Schmid (2014) demonstrate that upward looking comparison is a
significant determinant of individuals’ consumption decisions.
Regarding the interrelation between consumption externalities and private debt dy-
namics, there is yet no conclusive evidence. Bertrand and Morse (2016) provide in-
direct evidence that nonrich households rely on easier credit access to finance their
desired keeping up with richer coresidents. Moreover, they find a positive relation-
ship between the number of personal bankruptcy filings and top income levels. Geor-
garakos, Haliassos, and Pasini (2014) show that a higher average income increases
the tendency to borrow of households with incomes below average. Contrary, Coibion
et al. (2014) find that low-income households in high-inequality regions accumulate
less debt than similar households in low-inequality regions. However, their findings
are mainly driven bymortgages, whereas for our variable of interest, consumer credit,
the authors only find mixed results. Against this background, we investigate this re-
lationship within a structural model and show that relative consumption concerns are
an essential driver of aggregate credit dynamics.
Understanding how unsecured consumer credit fluctuates over the business cycle
is of central importance because of several reasons. First, consumer credit is an im-
portant source of personal finance. For our period of interest, the Great Moderation,1
credit averages 23% of aggregate personal consumption in the United States, indi-
cating that more than one-fifth of households’ private expenditures were financed by
relying on consumer credit.2 Second, short-run credit movements in the United States
are characterized by a highly volatile behavior. As Table 1 reports, credit is more than
1. Following Bertrand and Morse (2016) and Iacoviello and Pavan (2013), among others, we date
the Great Moderation as the time span between the early 1980s (here 1982 q1) and the outburst of the
financial crisis (2008 q2). We choose the Great Moderation as the underlying time span, because this
period is characterized by a significant widening of income disparities and several innovations in financial
markets, which ultimately made credit access for households easier. Notably, all our qualitative findings
are robust when extending the sample by the Great Recession.
2. Our consumer credit measure includes revolving and nonrevolving credit. Revolving credit primar-
ily consists of outstanding credit card balances and accounts for roughly one-third of aggregate consumer
credit. Nonrevolving credit includes auto loans as well as consumer installment loans. For a detailed anal-
ysis of consumer credit moments across categories and sample periods, we refer the interested reader to
Fieldhouse, Livshits, and MacGee (2016).
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TABLE 1
Credit-Related Moments In The U.S. (1982q1-2008q2)




Hours worked 0.3603 0.5080
Real wage −0.3207 0.3994
Note: ρ(xt ,Dt ) is the cross-correlation of variable x with credit, σx/σD is the std. deviation of variable x relative to the std. deviation of
credit. Consumer credit has been deflated using the price index of personal consumption expenditures. All variables are logged and HP-
filtered (smoothing parameter of 1600) to obtain cyclical components. For data definitions and sources, see Online Appendix A.
twice (three times) as volatile as output (consumption). Third, and most importantly,
business cycle correlations with other main aggregate variables contradict standard
theory in which credit represents an instrument to smooth consumption in bad times.
Table 1 shows positive comovements between credit and output and consumption,
respectively. In contrast to these empirical observations, one would expect counter-
cyclical correlations when credit is primarily used to smooth consumption.
Our proposed model economy is populated by two types of households. Investors,
who hold the economy’s entire capital stock, own firms, and supply credit, and work-
ers, who supply labor and demand credit to finance their desired level of consump-
tion. Moreover, we include a mechanism through which workers value their own
level of consumption relative to the investors’ level of consumption. We refer to
this mechanism as keeping up with the Riches.3 This extension allows us to capture
the “trickle-down-consumption” channel of Bertrand and Morse (2016), where the
income-poor try to catch up with the income-rich. In the baseline model, fluctuations
are driven by four stochastic innovations, namely, a neutral technology, investment-
specific technology, price markup, and wage markup shock. In standard DSGE mod-
els, both technology shocks are main drivers of fluctuations in real variables (Smets
and Wouters 2003, Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti 2010). Although in general
markup shocks play a minor role in driving output dynamics, we stress their impor-
tance in driving credit movements. In particular, in our model setup both innovations
shift resources between investors and workers, which in combination with consump-
tion externalities amplifies the credit changes compared to a framework that abstracts
from these externalities.
We estimate deep parameters of the four-shock model by a simulated methods of
moments (SMM) approach. The parameter measuring the degree of workers’ desire
to keep up with their richer fellows is estimated to be positive and statistically signif-
icant. This leads to the conclusion that keeping up with the Riches is a central driver
of credit dynamics over the business cycle. The models’ implied credit moments
3. This term is inspired by the literature on keeping up with the Joneses. While studies that incorporate
this mechanismmodel relative consumption concerns in relation to the average consumer (e.g., Galí 1994),
in our setup poorer households (workers) aim to keep up with richer ones (investors).
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successfully account for the (targeted) credit statistics as reported in Table 1. No-
tably, we also find that the estimated model replicates conventional output-related
statistics that are not targeted in the estimation. We interpret this result as a further
justification of our proposed model.
We perform several robustness checks. First, we show that our model without con-
sumption externalities is not able to generate the observed credit dynamics. A lagged
consumption externality, however, which induces a catching up behavior instead of
keeping up, matches the targeted moments, but slightly inferior to our baseline speci-
fication.Moreover, when accounting for a structural break in the data, we show that (i)
our specification successfully accounts for this fact and that (ii) although the strength
of the motive has decreased over time, consumption externalities play a crucial role
in explaining credit dynamics before and after this break.
When taking a closer look at the dynamics of the estimated model versions, we find
that the price markup shock and the investment-specific technology shock produce
credit correlations that are qualitatively in line with the empirical ones as reported
in Table 1. However, this is only true when we include the consumption external-
ity in the workers’ utility function. When we abstract from the relative consumption
motive, we find that the model dynamics to both shocks no more correspond to the
empirical counterparts. Notably, replicating the positive correlations between credit,
output, and consumption does rely on the keeping up mechanism. While recent liter-
ature finds that the price markup shock is of minor importance for output dynamics
(Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti 2010), our results indicate that innovations to
the price markup, combined with consumption externalities, are essential in replicat-
ing short-run credit movements. Concerning the neutral technology shock and the
wage markup shock, we find that the model responses do not replicate the empirical
credit correlations but the inclusion of these two shocks helps to improve the quantita-
tive performance of the model in terms of credit-related and output-related moments.
Our paper is related to the extensive quantitative literature on consumer credit and
bankruptcy, initiated by Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt
(2007).4 In particular, our study is related to Nakajima and Ríos-Rull (2014) who use
a quantitative business cycle model with incomplete markets and the option to de-
fault on debt to explain the procyclicality of consumer credit, the countercyclicality
of bankruptcy filings, and the high volatility of both. The key ingredient is counter-
cyclical earnings risk, implying that the variance of individual labor productivity is
higher during recessions. This countercyclicality leads to higher risk premia on loans
during recessions and thus, to a decrease in consumer debt. Fieldhouse, Livshits, and
MacGee (2016) use a lifecycle model with incomplete insurance markets and a simi-
lar bankruptcy mechanism to explain the business cycle properties of consumer credit
and bankruptcies. The authors find that only the addition of so-called intermediation
shocks, that is, exogenous countercyclical shocks to the cost of funds for lenders, can
generate procyclical borrowing and countercyclical bankruptcy filings. The mech-
anism behind this finding is that the intermediation shock increases the risk-free
4. See Livshits (2015) for an excellent overview.
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interest rate during recessions, simultaneously the cost of a loan, and thus, leads to a
decrease in borrowing.
We propose a different mechanism, which is based on recent microeconometric
evidence (Bertrand andMorse 2016), to account for consumer credit dynamics. How-
ever, we regard these different mechanisms as complementary, rather than competing
or mutually exclusive explanations for consumer credit fluctuations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the baseline model.
In Section 2, we introduce functional forms and show a set of theoretical results that
connect the strength of the keeping up mechanism to a set of deep model parameters.
Section 3 describes the calibration and estimation strategy as well as our numerical
results. In Section 4, we provide a detailed analysis of the implied model dynamics. In
Section 5, we conduct two important robustness tests. First, we show that our baseline
results are not affected by introducing a lagged consumption externality. Second, we
split the sample and show that, although the degree of upward looking comparisons
has decreased over time, it is still a significant factor of credit dynamics. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
1. THE MODEL ECONOMY
In this section, we construct our baseline model that allows consumption externali-
ties to influence the choices of households and that assesses its rolewithin the business
cycle. The economy is populated by a continuum of firms producing differentiated in-
termediate goods, a representative final good firm, and a representative labor bundler.
There are two types of households, investors and workers, who are distinguished by
their source of income as well as their access to capital and asset markets. Finally, a
financial intermediary issues deposits to investors and loans to workers.
1.1 Final Good Firms
In this perfectly competitive sector, a representative firm produces final consump-
tion goodYt , combining a continuum of intermediate goodsYt (l), l ∈ [0, 1], using the









with μt > 1. The time-varying price markup μt is a function of the elasticity of sub-
stitution between intermediate goods and follows an exogenous stochastic process
around its steady-state value μ̄ given by
logμt = (1 − ρμ) log μ̄+ ρμ logμt−1 + εμ,t, (2)
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where εμ,t
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ 2μ), and |ρμ| < 1. The firm chooses intermediate inputs to
maximize profits subject to (1), which yields the demand function for intermediate
good Yt (l),
















1.2 Intermediate Goods Firms
Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm ac-
cording to a production function given by
Yt (l) = ztF (Kt−1(l),Nt (l)), (5)
where we assume that F is strictly increasing, twice differentiable in both arguments,
exhibits constant returns to scale, and satisfies the Inada conditions. Kt−1(l) and Nt (l)
denote the quantities of capital and labor services utilized to produce intermediate
good Yt (l). zt is the technology level common across all firms. We assume that zt
follows an exogenous stochastic process around its steady-state value z̄,
log zt = (1 − ρz) log z̄+ ρz log zt−1 + εz,t, (6)
where εz,t
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ 2z ), and |ρz| < 1. Intermediate goods firms maximize profits,
defined by
t (l) = Yt (l) − RtKt−1(l) −WtNt (l), (7)
subject to the demand function (3) and to cost minimization, where Rt is the rental
rate of physical capital andWt is the aggregate wage rate. We assume symmetry such
that firms charge the same prices and choose the same production inputs. Prices are
perfectly flexible, which yields marginal costs that are equal to 1/μt . Thus, the aggre-
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where MPKt is the marginal product of capital.
Following Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), among others, μt can also be in-
terpreted as the labor wedge on the firm side, as it drives a wedge between the wage
rate and the marginal product of labor.
In the following sections, it will become apparent that the pricemarkup shock shifts
income from the poor to the rich households. Thus, we refer to (2) as a redistribution
shock.5
1.3 Employment Agency
As in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), we assume that each working house-
hold j is a monopolistic supplier of a differentiated labor service Nw,t ( j). A represen-
tative labor bundler, termed as employment agency, combines the intermediate labor










with νt > 1. The time-varying wage markup νt is a function of the elasticity of sub-
stitution between labor types and follows an exogenous stochastic process around its
steady-state value ν̄,
log νt = (1 − ρν ) log ν̄ + ρν log νt−1 + εν,t, (11)
where εν,t
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ 2ν ), and |ρν | < 1. The labor bundler operates in a perfectly com-
petitive market and minimizes the cost of a given amount of aggregate labor Nw,t ,
taking each household’s wage rateWt ( j) as given, leading to the labor demand func-
tion







whereWt is the aggregate wage index. By substituting (12) into (10), we obtain the









5. Throughout the paper, we use the two terms redistribution shock and price markup shock
interchangeably.
8 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
1.4 Households
Our model economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived households,
indexed on the unit interval. A fraction χ of households is born as investors (sub-
script i), holds the entire stock of physical capital, and owns firms. The remaining
fraction 1 − χ is born as workers (subscript w), makes up the entire labor force,
and does not have access to capital or stock markets. However, workers can get a
credit from financial intermediaries, which helps them to finance their desired level of
consumption.





where βi ∈ (0, 1) is the specific discount factor of investors,Ui(·) is the period utility
function, and E0 is the expectations operator with respect to information in period 0.
Since investors do not supply labor, we assume that the level of consumption is the
only argument of the investors’ utility function.
Definition 1 (Investors’ utility function). We impose the following assumptions on
















Assumption (i) states that the utility function is strictly increasing, twice differen-
tiable, and strictly concave in the investors’ level of consumption. Assumption (ii)
ensures that the Inada conditions hold.
Investors can hold two different assets. They are the sole owner of the capital stock,
which is rented to intermediate goods firms at rate Rt , and they have a riskless savings
account at the financial intermediary. For each unit of savings, the investor gets an
interest of id . The investors’ budget constraint is then given by




where Ii,t denotes investment, Di,t ∈ R+ are deposits, Qdt := 1/(1 + idt−1) ∈ (0, 1),
with idt being the interest received, and t/χ is the individual share of profits from
ownership of firms. The law of motion for physical capital is
Ki,t = (1 − δ)Ki,t−1 + ζt Ii,t, (16)
where δ is the depreciation rate. ζt denotes a shock to the relative price of invest-
ment in terms of the consumption good. We assume that the shock follows an AR
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(1)-process around its steady-state value ζ̄ ,
log ζt = (1 − ρζ ) log ζ̄ + ρζ log ζt−1 + εζ,t, (17)
where εζ,t
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ 2ζ ), and |ρζ | < 1. The investors’ optimization problem is then
given by the objective function (14), which is maximized subject to (15) and (16) so
that the first-order conditions are given by
i,t = U ′i (Ci,t ), (18)
i,t = βiEtζti,t+1
(






t = βiEti,t+1, (20)
where U ′i (·) denotes the first derivative of the utility function with respect to the ar-
gument in brackets, and i,t denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with (15).









ji,t+ jQdt+ jDi,t+ j = 0, (22)
are required to hold.






Cw,t ( j),Xt ( j),Nw,t ( j)
)
, (23)
where βw ∈ (0, 1) is the specific discount factor of workers,Uw(·) is the period util-
ity function, Cw,t ( j) is the workers’ consumption level, and Xt ( j) is a consumption
externality that is strictly positive and that workers take as given. In each period,
workers are endowed with one unit of time that is allocated between leisure Lw,t ( j)
and individual labor services Nw,t ( j).
Definition 2 (Worker’s utility function). We impose the following assumptions on































∂X < 0 ∨ ∂Uw∂X > 0,
(v) ∂MRSw
∂X > 0 ∨ ∂MRSw∂X < 0, where MRSw := − ∂Uw/∂Lw∂Uw/∂Cw .
Assumptions (i), (ii), and (iii) refer to the standard properties of utility functions,
namely, that they are twice differentiable, strictly increasing in consumption, strictly
decreasing in labor, strictly concave in these two variables, and that Inada conditions
are satisfied. The key issue here is the role of the consumption externality in (iv)
and (v).6 Assumption (v) specifies the effect of X in terms of the marginal rate of
substitution (MRS) between leisure and consumption.We say that preferences exhibit
keeping up with the Riches, if theMRS is increasing in X (first argument of (v)). This
implies that a rise in the consumption externality may raise the worker’s marginal
utility of consumption relative to leisure, leading the worker to work more hours if
prices are fixed. Preferences that feature the opposite effect are termed running away
from the Riches (second argument of (v)).7 Note that assumption (iv) is necessary for
(v) but not vice versa.
Including this consumption externality mechanism is motivated by recent microe-
conometric studies, which find that upward looking comparison significantly affects
individuals’ consumption decisions (Drechsel-Grau and Schmid 2014, Bertrand and
Morse 2016, Carr and Jayadev 2015).
Workers face the following budget constraint,
Cw,t ( j) + Dw,t−1( j) ≤Wt ( j)Nw,t ( j) + Qbt Dw,t ( j) −
φ
2
(Dw,t ( j) − D̄w )2, (24)
where Dw,t ( j) ∈ R+ denotes received credit at price Qbt := 1/(1 + ibt−1) ∈ (0, 1),
with ibt being the interest paid, and Wt ( j) is the individual wage rate of household
j. The last term of (24) represents a quadratic cost of choosing a quantity of credit
different from the steady-state value D̄w. This assumption can be thought of as a kind
of transaction cost and is needed to rule out random walk components in the equilib-






Qbt+sDw,t+ j ≤ 0. (25)
The optimization problem of working household j is then given by the objective func-
tion (23) subject to (24), (25), and the demand for the household’s differentiated
6. Following Dupor and Liu (2003), preferences exhibit jealousy if the worker derives disutility from
an increase in the externality (first argument of (iv)), and admiration if the opposite is true (second argument
of (iv)).
7. For specific preferences that are additively separable in (Cw,X ) and Lw , assumption (v) is equivalent
to [∂2Uw/(∂Cw∂X )]/[∂Uw/∂Cw] ≷ 0, as used by Galí (1994), but in general this is not the case.
8. Similar to our problem, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) compare different modeling strategies that
induce stationarity within small open economy models.
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labor input (12). We assume symmetric working households such that all workers
set the same wage, supply the same amount of labor, and choose the same amount
of consumption and credit. As for the final good price, we assume that wages are
perfectly flexible.
Letting w,t be the workers’ Lagrange multiplier on their budget constraint, the
symmetric optimal choices for consumption, labor supply, and credit demand are
then ultimately determined by
w,t = U ′w(Cw,t ), (26)






)] = βwEtw,t+1, (28)
where U ′w(·) denotes the first derivative of the utility function with respect to the
argument in brackets.
From (27), it is apparent that the wage rate is a function of the marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and consumption, MRSt , and the wage markup νt ,
Wt = νtMRSt . (29)
In close analogy to the price markup, νt can be interpreted as the labor wedge on the
household side. In a perfectly competitive economy, μt and νt would be one such that
wages equal the marginal product of labor on the one hand, and the marginal rate of
substitution on the other.
1.5 Financial Intermediaries
There is a representative financial intermediary that issues one-period deposits to
investors and one-period loans to workers. We follow Cúrdia and Woodford (2010)
by assuming that this type of intermediation is costly.9 In particular, we assume that
the following condition describes the financing of the intermediary,
Dt = Bt +(Bt ), (30)
where Dt are aggregate deposits, Bt are aggregate loans, and (·) are intermediation
costs.10 Equation (30) states that deposits at period t have to cover loans at period t,














9. These costs include, for example, operating costs, but are also supposed to capture default risk.
10. Following Cúrdia and Woodford (2010), we assume that (·) is positive and twice differentiable
for B > 0, with (0) = 0, ∂/∂B > 0, and ∂2/(∂B)2 > 0.
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subject to (30). Perfect competition then yields the following first-order condition
(
1 − Qbt
) − (1 − Qdt ) ∂(Bt )∂Bt = 1 − Qdt , (32)
implying that the gains from one additional unit of loans are equal to the cost of one
additional unit of deposits. We use this optimality condition to define a spread 
between the interest rates in the following way,




(1 +t ), (33)
wheret := ∂(Bt )/∂Bt . It follows from the properties of thatt is strictly larger
than zero and increasing in the amount of aggregate loans for Bt > 0, and subse-
quently, that the borrowing interest rate has to be strictly larger than the interest rate
on deposits.
1.6 Aggregation and Market Clearing
Aggregates are defined as the weighted average of the respective variables for each
household type. Hence, we get
Ct = χCi,t + (1 − χ )Cw,t, (34)
It = χ Ii,t . (35)
The markets for capital and labor clear when
Kt = χKi,t, (36)
Nt = (1 − χ )Nw,t, (37)
at their respective prices Rt andWt , deposit and credit market clearing require that
Dt = χDi,t (38)
Bt = (1 − χ )Dw,t, (39)
at prices Qdt and Q
b
t , while the aggregate resource constraint is given by
Yt = Ct + It + (1 − χ )φ
2
(Dw,t − D̄w )2 +(Bt ). (40)
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1.7 Equilibrium
In this section, we define the equilibrium for the economy described above.
Definition 3 (Competitive equilibrium). Given the exogenous realizations of {ζt ,
μt , zt , νt }∞t=0, a competitive rational expectations equilibrium is a stochastic set of
sequences
{Ct ,Ci,t ,Cw,t ,Di,t ,Dw,t , It , Ii,t ,Kt ,Ki,t ,i,t ,w,t ,Nt ,Nw,t ,t ,Qbt ,Qdt ,Rt ,Wt ,Yt ,Dt ,Bt}∞t=0
satisfying
(i) the investors’ first-order conditions (18)–(20), with binding budget con-
straint (15) and transversality conditions (21) and (22),
(ii) the workers’ first-order conditions (26)–(28), with binding budget con-
straint (24) and binding no-Ponzi condition (25),
(iii) factor prices (8) and (9), capital accumulation (16), profits definition (7), and
production technology (5),
(iv) the financial intermediaries’ first-order condition (32) as well as condition
(30),
(v) the aggregation identities (34) and (35), and
(vi) the market clearing condition for capital (36), labor (37), deposits (38), and
loans (39).
The model is solved by a log-linear approximation around its deterministic
steady state.
2. THEORETICAL RESULTS
The next subsection presents our choice of functional forms for the production
technology and the utility functions, as well as some qualitative results that connect
the strength of the keeping up mechanism with two model parameters.
2.1 Functional Forms
The investors’ period utility function is given by
Ui(Ci) = logCi, (41)
while the workers’ period utility function is assumed to be
Uw(Cw,X,Nw ) = (CwX
−b)1−σ − 1
1 − σ −
γN1+ηw
1 + η , (42)
where b indicates the strength of the consumption externality, σ is a risk aversion
parameter, γ is a scaling parameter, and η denotes the inverse Frisch elasticity of
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such that workers value the contemporaneous consumption level of investors relative
to their own.11 The sign of b then ultimately determines if preferences exhibit jealousy
or admiration. If b is positive, Uw implies jealousy, while for negative values, the
conditions for admiration are met.
In the following, we exclude the case of σ = 1. Assuming a logarithmic form for
the first part of the workers’ utility function would imply that the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure is independent of the consumption ex-
ternality. This is a violation of condition (v) in Definition 2 and therefore, we assume
that σ > 0 and σ 
= 1.
The magnitude of σ and the sign of b are of crucial importance whether working
households aim to keep up with the investors or if they are running away. This re-
lationship can be expressed by sgn(∂Uw/∂X ) = sgn(b(1 − σ )). In particular, there
are the four different cases {b > 0, σ > 1}, {b < 0, σ ∈ (0, 1)}, {b > 0, σ ∈ (0, 1)},
and {b < 0, σ > 1}. While the first two cases imply that workers wish to keep up,
the latter imply running away. As our estimations below indicate, only the first case
is relevant.
Intermediate good firms produce according to the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion
Yt = ztKαt−1N1−αt , (44)
where α ∈ [0, 1] measures the output elasticity of capital. This specification implies
that MPLt = (1 − α)Yt/Nt and MPKt = αYt/Kt−1.
We follow Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) and set the functional form for intermedi-
ation costs as
(Bt ) = ψBκt , (45)
where ψ is a positive constant and κ can be interpreted as the elasticity of loans.
2.2 A First Set of Results
The following two results clarify the role of b and σ on shaping the behavior of
working households and consequently, their role for the cyclical properties of our
economy. We first present the workers’ specific consumption Euler equation, which
11. Similar specifications of relative consumption motives are used by Airaudo and Bossi (2017) and
Alvarez-Cuadrado and Japaridze (2017). They study how consumption externalities affect the impact of
monetary policy and financial deregulation, respectively. In a later section, we show that our results are
robust when modeling the externality based on lagged consumption levels.
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relates the consumption growth of investors and changes in the credit price to their
own consumption growth. Afterward, we analytically derive the response of thework-
ers’ consumption to a marginal increase in the investors’ consumption level. The re-
sult is of particular importance to our quantitative analysis in the following, as we
are then be able to compare our result to related empirical findings of Bertrand and
Morse (2016).
Proposition 1. Suppose that the consumption externality is given by (43) and ab-
stracting from debt adjustment costs, the workers’ log-linearized Euler equation is
given by
Ĉw,t+1 − Ĉw,t = − 1









where a circumflex indicates log-deviations from the respective steady-state value.
This proposition shows that the workers’ intertemporal consumption choice is de-
termined by two channels, consumption smoothing and the keeping up motive. Since
workers do not have access to capital markets, they are not able to transfer their in-
come between periods so that the only option to smooth consumption is via credit. A
high σ therefore implies that fluctuations in the price of credit have less influence on
the consumption decision and the respective household prefers a smooth consumption
profile. The strength of consumption smoothing in our setting is jointly determined
by σ and b. In this sense, a positive b amplifies the consumption smoothing motive
of workers, as long as σ > 1.
On the other hand, σ also affects the strength of the keeping up motive, as can be
seen in the second term on the right-hand side of (46). A positive b then implies that
the keeping up motive is increasing in σ . If b is equal to zero, the keeping up channel
is shut down and consumption smoothing is only determined by σ .
The following proposition characterizes the influence of b on the worker’s con-
sumption decision when there is an increase in the investor’s consumption level.
Proposition 2. Suppose that σ > 1. Given an exogenous one-time change in in-
vestor’s consumption dĈi,t , the worker’s consumption response is given by




(W̄ N̄w+ (Q̄b )2φ )
(σ+b(σ−1))
η
(W̄ N̄w+ (Q̄b )2φ )+C̄w
, and |ξ0| ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Online Appendix B. 
This proposition states that the (partial equilibrium) response of workers is deter-
mined by b and σ , besides a few positive steady-state values and the labor supply
elasticity. Unsurprisingly, the response is zero if b is equal to zero. This expression
is of particular importance in our numerical analysis below, as we use it to compare
this value to the values found in Bertrand and Morse (2016).





Investors’ discount factor βi 0.995 Annual real interest rate of 2%
Workers’ discount factor βw 0.994 Credit-to-labor income of 27%
Inverse Frisch elasticity η 1.000 Hall (2009)
Disutility of labor γ 5817.827 SS labor supply of 0.33
Fraction of investors χ 0.200 Bertrand and Morse (2016)
Technology
Capital share α 0.330 Capital share of income of 26%
Depreciation rate δ 0.025 Annual depreciation of 10%
Credit friction
Intermed. cost constant ψ 2.629 SS credit spread of 2%
Loan elasticity κ 5.000 Cúrdia and Woodford (2010)
Steady-state
Price markup ν̄ 1.250 48% income share of investors
Wage markup μ̄ 1.100 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011)
Labor N̄ 0.330 Normalization
Neutral technology z̄ 1.000 Normalization
Inv.-spec. technology ζ̄ 1.000 Normalization
3. PARAMETERIZATION
We use an SMM approach to estimate a subset of the structural parameters of the
model. Of particular importance are the parameters that determine the impact of the
relative consumption motive, namely, b and σ . The characteristics of the neutral tech-
nology shock and the redistribution shock are estimated by ordinary least squares. The
parameters that are not estimated are calibrated in a standard fashion.
3.1 Calibrated Parameters
Table 2 reports the calibrated parameter values, where an upper bar denotes
the steady-state value of the respective variable. One model period corresponds to
one quarter.
The discount factor of investors is set to 0.995 to match an annual steady-state real
interest rate of 2%. Workers have a discount factor of 0.994 to match a steady-state
credit-to-labor income ratio of 27%, which is the average for the Great Moderation.
We choose an inverse Frisch elasticity η of 1, which is in the range of values suggested
by Hall (2009). We normalize the steady-state level of labor supply to 0.33 and set
γ accordingly.
To ensure comparability to the empirical study of Bertrand and Morse (2016),
the share of investors (rich households) in the overall population χ is set to 20%12;
α equals 0.33, implying a steady-state capital share of income of about 26%. The
12. The same ratio of workers-to-capital owners is chosen by Lansing and Markiewicz (2018).
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depreciation rate of capital δ equals 0.025, which corresponds to an annual depreci-
ation rate on capital equal to 10%.
The intermediation cost function includes two parameters. Forφ, we choose a value
of 2.629 to generate a steady-state credit spread of 2% (annualized). The loan elas-
ticity κ is set to 5 as in Cúrdia and Woodford (2010).
We assign a value of 1.25 to the steady-state price markup to match an investors’
income share of 48%.13 For the steady-state wage markup, we follow Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2011) and choose 1.1, which is in the interval of typically used values in
the literature. The steady-state levels z̄ and ζ̄ are normalized to 1.
3.2 OLS Estimation
In line with the construction of the empirical moments reported in Table 1, the sam-
ple for the OLS estimation covers the period 1982q1 to 2008q2. With the exception
of the TFP series, all data series mentioned in the following are obtained from the
FRED database.14
TFP data are taken from Fernald (2014). This quarterly series on aggregate tech-
nology controls for aggregation effects, varying utilization of capital and labor, non-
constant returns, and imperfect competition. The variable is detrended before esti-
mation by a one-sided HP-filter, as suggested by Stock and Watson (1999), with a
smoothing value of 1,600. The estimated AR-coefficient and standard deviation are
0.837 and 0.008, respectively. These estimates are similar to the findings of Bullard
and Singh (2012) who use the standard (unadjusted) Solow residual to calculate the
shock characteristics.
For constructing a time series of the price markup, we follow Galí, Gertler, and
López-Salido (2007) and use the following equation,
μt = MPLt − wt, (48)
where the marginal product of labor MPLt equals log[(1 − α)yt/nt]. yt/nt is mea-
sured as the real output per hour worked of all persons in the nonfarm business sec-
tor, and wt is the log of real compensation per hour in this sector. Again, all series
are detrended by the one-sided HP-filter. The estimates of the AR-coefficient and
the standard deviation are 0.777 and 0.006, respectively, and thus, similar to those
of Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2007) and Karabarbounis (2014). The upper part
of Table 3 summarizes the parameter values estimated by OLS.
3.3 SMM Estimation
According to equation (29), the wage markup νt is defined as the product of the
real wage rateWt and the marginal rate of substitutionMRSt . Given the specific utility
13. This value is taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years from 1982 to 2007.
14. See Online Appendix A for a detailed description of the data.





AR(1)-coefficient technology shock ρz 0.8368 (0.0554)
Standard deviation technology shock σz 0.0084 (0.0031)
AR(1)-coefficient redistribution shock ρμ 0.7769 (0.0629)
Standard deviation redistribution shock σμ 0.0063 (0.0024)
Parameter Prior Value SD
Relative consumption motive b 0.0000 2.9198 (0.1708)
Risk aversion parameter σ 2.0000 4.1754 (0.1658)
Debt adjustment cost parameter φ 0.0000 0.9961 (0.0072)
AR-coefficient inv.-spec. technology shock ρζ 0.5000 0.9181 (0.0029)
Standard deviation investment shock σζ 0.0050 0.0102 (0.0001)
AR-coefficient wage markup shock ρν 0.5000 0.6080 (0.0378)
Standard deviation wage markup shock σν 0.0050 0.0281 (0.0009)





, where w,t = C−σw,t Xtb(σ−1). (49)
Calculating a wage markup series would require data onCi andCw, and an appro-
priate value for b, the parameter measuring the strength of the relative consumption
motive. However, since there is no such data available, to the best of our knowledge,
and there is little guidance in the literature about values for b, we use the SMM esti-
mator to overcome this data problem.15 The objective of SMM is to find a parameter
vector that minimizes the weighted distance between simulated model moments and
their empirical counterparts.
Let ̂ be a k × 1 vector of empirical moments computed from the data and let
(θ ) be the k × 1 vector of simulated moments computed from artificial data. The
corresponding time series are generated from simulating the model given a draw of
random shocks and the p× 1 vector θ ∈ , with ⊆ Rp. The length of the simulated
series is τT , where T is the number of observations in the real data set and τ ≥ 1 is




̂−(θ )]′ϒ−1[̂−(θ )], (50)
where ϒ is a k × k positive-definite weighting matrix.
Specifically, ̂ contains the consumer credit moments as shown in Table 1. θ̃SMM
contains the estimates for b, σ , φ, ρζ , σζ , ρν , and σν . For the weighting matrix, we
15. The SMM approach was proposed by McFadden (1989) and extended by Lee and Ingram (1991),
among others.
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follow Ruge-Murcia (2013) and choose a matrix with diagonal elements equal to the
optimal weighting matrix while all off-diagonal elements are equal to zero.16 Hence,
we only put weight on moments that are observed in the data and force the estimation
to consider only economically meaningful moments (see Cochrane 2005, chap. 11).
Additionally, we follow Born and Pfeifer (2014) and incorporate prior information
about the parameters to estimate. In particular, we choose prior means θ̄ for each
parameter in θ and expand [̂−(θ )] by (θ̃SMM − θ̄ ), the deviation of the estimated
parameter from the respective prior mean. We expand ϒ by attaching small penalty
terms to the diagonal, which raise the objective function when deviating from the
prior mean. The penalties are of negligible magnitude compared to the other elements
in ϒ but impose soft bounds on the parameters.17 We choose this procedure to rule
out local minima in implausible regions of the state space, which is often the case
when estimating DSGE models.18 Since we want to be agnostic about the strength
of the relative consumption motive b, we choose a prior mean of 0 so that deviations
from zero are only tolerated if they imply significant improvements in the targeted
moments.
To rule out dependence on one particular draw of shocks, we draw several sets of
shocks and choose the parameter set that minimizes the mean of all objective func-
tions. We use the following algorithm to estimate θ .
Algorithm 1 (Construction of objective function to be minimized). We start
with a guess for θ̃SMM . Then:
(1) Draw 50 sets of shocks, each consisting of (τT + 1500) × 4 values.
(2) For each set of shocks: solve the model, simulate time series, discard the first
1500 periods, compute moments, compute objective function.
(3) Take the mean of all 50 objective function values and minimize this.
We set τ to 10, implying that the artificial time series are 10 times larger than
the original sample size. Ruge-Murcia (2013) shows that this is a useful choice for
handling the trade-off between accuracy and computational cost.
Following Ruge-Murcia (2013), we compute the standard errors of θ̃SMM from an
estimate of its asymptotic covariance matrix as
(1 + 1/τ )(J′ϒJ)−1J′ϒJSJ(J′ϒJ)−1, (51)
where J is the Jacobian matrix and S is the full variance–covariance matrix of the
empirical moments.
16. Ruge-Murcia (2013) shows that this choice produces consistent parameter estimates, while stan-
dard errors are just slightly higher than those generated with the optimal weighting matrix. The optimal
weighting matrix is given by the inverse of the variance–covariance matrix associated with the sample mo-
ments. We compute this matrix with the VARHAC-estimator with automatic lag selection by the Bayesian
information criterion (see Den Haan and Levin 1997).
17. Born and Pfeifer (2014) show that this procedure can be interpreted as using a truncated nor-
mal distribution.
18. Also known as the “dilemma of absurd parameter estimates,” see An and Schorfheide (2007).
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TABLE 4
Data And Simulated Model Moments
ρ(xt ,Dt ) σx/σD ρ(xt ,Yt ) σx/σY
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Output 0.1523 0.1246 0.4568 0.3364 - - - -
Consumption 0.1658 0.1548 0.2783 0.3046 0.8020 0.7468 0.6092 0.9059
Investment 0.0852 0.0227 1.7524 1.0194 0.9061 0.7086 3.8359 3.0321
Hours worked 0.3603 0.4112 0.5080 0.5619 0.8144 0.6797 1.1120 1.6717
Real wage −0.3207 −0.5422 0.3994 0.4977 0.0023 −0.2883 0.8743 1.4819
Note: ρ(xt ,Dt ) is the cross-correlation of variable xwith credit, σx/σD is the std. deviation of variable x relative to the std. deviation of credit,
ρ(xt ,Yt ) is the cross-correlation of variable x with output, σx/σY is the std. deviation of variable x relative to the std. deviation of output.
Consumer credit has been deflated using the price index of personal consumption expenditures. All variables are logged and HP-filtered
(smoothing parameter of 1600) to obtain cyclical components. For data definitions and sources, see Online Appendix A.
The results of the SMM estimation are shown in the lower part of Table 3. For b,
we obtain a value of 2.92 that is estimated to be significantly different from zero,
indicating a strong presence of the relative consumption motive. For σ , we estimate a
value of 4.18. To get a better interpretation of these values, we make use of Proposi-
tion 2, which quantifies the (partial equilibrium) reaction of workers’ consumption to
an increase in investors’ consumption. Inserting the values of b and σ as well as the
estimate of the debt adjustment cost parameter φ into ξ0 gives a coefficient of 0.6416.
This implies that a 1% increase in investors’ consumption leads to an increase of about
0.64% in workers’ consumption. This elasticity is in the upper range of estimates pro-
vided by Bertrand and Morse (2016), which implies that our estimated model is able
to replicate microeconometric evidence on the strength of the keeping up-motive.
The investment specific technology shock is estimated to have a relatively high de-
gree of persistence, whereas the wage markup shock displays a relatively low degree
of persistence.Moreover, the standard deviations of both shocks, σζ and σν , are in line
with values found by related studies.19 The estimated debt adjustment cost parameter
φ takes a value of 0.996.
Columns 2–5 of Table 4 report the credit moments obtained from the data and
from the model simulations. All these model moments are close to the empirical ones
with only minor discrepancies. As in the data, the model dynamics imply positive
correlations between credit and consumption, output and hours worked, respectively,
whereas the real wage and consumer credit are negatively correlated. Investment does
not show a contemporaneous correlation with credit. Also in line with their empirical
counterparts, the estimated model implies that output, consumption, hours worked,
and the real wage are less volatile than consumer credit, whereas investment displays
a higher relative volatility. Thus, the rather negligible differences suggest that our
calibration/estimation exercise provides a set of reasonable parameter values and,
furthermore, supports the inclusion of the keeping up with the Riches mechanism
into the proposed theoretical setup.
19. See, for example, Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2007), Iacoviello (2015).
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TABLE 5
Estimated Parameter Values For Both Specifications
Parameter b = b̂ b = 0
Relative consumption motive b 2.9198 -
Risk aversion parameter σ 4.1754 8.1658
Debt adjustment cost parameter φ 0.9961 1.0349
AR-coefficient investment-specific technology shock ρζ 0.9181 0.7376
Standard deviation investment shock σζ 0.0102 0.0137
AR-coefficient wage markup shock ρν 0.6080 0.4976
Standard deviation wage markup shock σν 0.0281 0.0076
Columns 6–9 of Table 4 show the correlations between output and the remaining
four aggregate variables as well as the standard deviations of these aggregates rela-
tive to the standard deviation of output. Note that these statistics are not included in
the moment-matching approach so that we can interpret these results as the model’s
ability to replicate important conventional business cycle relations.
Simulating the model leads to a strong procyclical behavior of investment and
hours worked with correlation coefficients close to the empirical moments. Moreover,
the model produces a strong positive comovement between output and consumption
as observed in the data. The implied relative standard deviations of these variables
also show a similar magnitude as their empirical counterparts. The only two mo-
ments that are qualitatively off are those related to the wage rate. However, recent
research has revealed significant changes in the comovements of most labor market
variables since the beginning of the Great Moderation (e.g., Galí and Gambetti 2009,
Andrés, Boscá, and Ferri 2013). Reproducing the acyclical behavior of real wages
documented in Table 4 therefore poses a challenge for most macroeconomic models.
Nevertheless, the differences between the two sets of moments are only small-sized
so that we interpret the results of this quantitative exercise as a validation of our pro-
posed model and the underlying calibration/estimation strategy.
3.4 Estimation Without b
In the following, we demonstrate that our proposed model that includes the rela-
tive consumption motive outperforms the model in which the relative consumption
motive is excluded. In doing so, we repeat our model estimation but set b = 0 so that
we abstract from any consumption externalities. Table 5 shows the estimated param-
eters of this exercise and compares them to our baseline estimation, which includes
the relative consumption motive. It turns out that some parameters for the model with
b = 0 alter drastically compared to the baseline case. In particular, σ is estimated to
be significantly larger than in our baseline case. This is not surprising as the baseline
estimation suggests a strong consumption smoothing channel, as specified in Propo-
sition 1. To achieve a similar strength of the channel in absence of b, σ has to be
considerably higher than in the baseline.
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TABLE 6
Data And Simulated Model Moments For Both Specifications
ρ(xt ,Dt ) σx/σD
Data b = b̂ b = 0 Data b = b̂ b = 0
Output 0.1523 0.1246 −0.0320 0.4568 0.3364 0.2743
Consumption 0.1658 0.1548 0.0743 0.2783 0.3046 0.2348
Investment 0.0852 0.0227 −0.0643 1.7524 1.0194 1.5863
Hours worked 0.3603 0.4112 0.6418 0.5080 0.5619 0.5008
Real wage −0.3207 −0.5422 −0.7265 0.3994 0.4977 0.6804
ρ(xt ,Yt ) σx/σY
Data b = b̂ b = 0 Data b = b̂ b = 0
Consumption 0.8020 0.7468 −0.1286 0.6092 0.9059 0.8567
Investment 0.9061 0.7086 0.8538 3.8359 3.0321 5.7848
Hours worked 0.8144 0.6797 0.0245 1.1120 1.6717 1.8296
Real wage 0.0023 −0.2883 0.1160 0.8743 1.4819 2.4864
Note: ρ(xt ,Dt ) is the cross-correlation of variable x with credit, σx/σD is the std. deviation of variable x relative to the std. deviation of
credit.
The model in which b = 0 performs worse in replicating the credit moments com-
pared to our proposed setup. As Table 6 shows, the model that excludes upward look-
ing consumption comparison does neither reproduce the positive correlation between
credit and output nor the positive correlation between investment and credit. Instead,
both correlations are negative, although only slightly. Moreover, when b = 0, the pos-
itive correlation between consumption and credit is considerably smaller. Further-
more, both the positive correlation between credit and hours worked and the negative
correlation between credit and the wage rate are considerably larger than in the data.
In addition, the model that abstracts from the consumption externality induces a neg-
ative correlation between output and consumption, which stands in sharp contrast
to the data. This counterintuitive relation is a result of the high estimated risk aver-
sion that decouples aggregate consumption from the business cycle. We show below
that two of the four shocks are specifically responsible for this result as they imply a
negative relation between output and consumption when b = 0.
To conclude, we see the worse credit correlations and overall output moments im-
plied by the model that does not include the relative consumption motive as a further
justification of our proposed model mechanism. Including the keeping up parameter
significantly improves the model’s ability to match the data.
4. MODEL DYNAMICS
In the previous section, we have shown that our proposed four-shock model suc-
cessfully replicates the empirical credit moments. Now, we investigate the model
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dynamics induced by each of the four shocks separately. Table 7 presents the credit
moments obtained from simulating our model where dynamics are driven by just one
of the four shocks. Afterward, we present impulse responses for the two different
model estimations, the unrestricted baseline estimation and the restricted estimation
with b = 0 from Section 3.4, to highlight the impact of the keeping up mechanism.
4.1 Moment Analysis
The upper part of Table 7 reports the correlations between credit and the respec-
tive macroeconomic aggregate for each shock separately. We find for the unrestricted
model that the price markup and the investment-specific technology shock lead to a
positive comovement between credit and output as well as between credit and con-
sumption. The remaining two shocks produce negative correlations between credit
and output and credit and consumption irrespective of the inclusion of keeping up
behavior. In contrast to the unrestricted estimation, the price markup shock leads to
a strong negative correlation between credit and consumption for the model that ab-
stracts from consumption externalities. Moreover, the investment-specific technology
shock produces a negative correlation between credit and output and credit and invest-
ment, while the former correlation is positive when estimating b. In this case, the neu-
tral technology, price markup, and investment-specific technology shock also induce
a positive correlation between credit and hours worked and a negative comovement
between credit and wages, perfectly in line with the data. Clear differences between
the responses of both model estimations can be observed for the price markup and
the investment-specific shock. As we will explain in more detail in the next subsec-
tions, the price markup and the investment-specific technology shock are of major
importance in reproducing procyclical credit dynamics.
Turning to the relative standard deviations, we see for the unrestricted estimation
that both markup shocks and the neutral technology shock lead to output, consump-
tion, and hours dynamics that are less volatile than the respective credit dynamics. The
investment-specific technology shock, on the other hand, produces consumption and
hours series that are more volatile than credit, while investment exhibits less volatil-
ity. The latter is also true for the neutral technology and the wage markup shock in
the unrestricted parameterization. In contrast, only the price markup shock induces
investment responses that are more volatile than the credit ones. All four shocks pro-
duce wage series that are less volatile than the simulated credit series.
We can use our model simulation also to gain some insights into how relative in-
come and consumption fluctuate over the business cycle. For this purpose, we con-
struct a series for consumption and income inequality, respectively.20 As the third
part of Table 7 reports, consumption and income inequality are positively corre-
lated with credit, implying that an increase in inequality is accompanied by a rise in
credit. This holds true irrespective of estimating b or setting b = 0. Nevertheless, the
20. Consumption inequality is defined as the ratio between investors’ consumption and workers’ con-
sumption. Income inequality is defined as the ratio between investors’ income (the sum of profits, income
from physical capital and income from deposits) and workers’ income (labor income).
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correlation between consumption inequality and credit is slightly stronger when we
estimate b. This finding is supported by the evidence of Bertrand and Morse (2016),
Georgarakos, Haliassos, and Pasini (2014) who find that growing inequality is posi-
tively associated with an increase in consumer credit. Overall, we find that both the
markup shocks produce the strongest correlation between consumption inequality
and credit, irrespective of b.
Consumption and income inequality are both positively correlated with output
when estimating b, implying a widening (narrowing) of income and consumption
differences in a boom (recession). While all shocks generate more or less a perfect
correlation between output and income inequality, the procyclicality of consumption
inequality is driven by shocks to price markup and investment. When setting b = 0
consumption inequality is countercyclical, whereas income inequality shows a strong
procyclical pattern, as all shocks generate this result.21
We also investigate how the borrowing interest rate behaves in bothmodel versions.
Irrespective of estimating b or setting b = 0, the interest rate is negatively correlated
with credit, implying lower (higher) credit costs when credit markets become loose
(tight). Turning to the correlation with output, we find for the unrestricted estimation
that the borrowing interest rate behaves countercyclical such that the credit price goes
up (down) when output is high (low).22 This negative correlation is mainly driven by
dynamics due to the investment-specific shock. Contrary, when restricting b, we find
a procyclical borrowing interest rate mainly due to both technology shocks.
To get a better understanding of the keeping up mechanism, in the following, we
discuss in more detail impulse responses. We focus here on the two most important
shocks in our model, the price markup shock and the investment-specific technology
shock.23
4.2 Price Markup Shock
Figure 1 presents the model responses to a price markup shock. The shock leads to
a falling wage rate while not affecting the marginal product of labor. A similar effect
can be observed for the rental rate of capital. Due to lower marginal cost, profits
rise so that investors obtain a higher income, and increase their consumption level
and investment. If the relative consumption motive is present (solid lines), working
households respond by increasing their consumption level as well. They derive the
additionally required income through two sources. First, workers raise their labor
supply and second, they enhance their demand for credit so that the drop in labor
21. The cyclical behavior of income inequality is still an open question in the literature. While some
studies find that income inequality moves countercyclical (Heathcote, Perri, and Violante 2010), others
detect a procyclical behavior especially during the Great Moderation during which inequality increased
significantly (Morin 2019, Galbraith 2009). Moreover, note that our inequality measures are based on just
two representative households and should therefore not be directly compared to commonly used inequality
measures that take the whole income (consumption) distribution into account.
22. This is in line with themechanism in Nakajima and Ríos-Rull (2014) who consider not only neutral
technology shocks but also countercyclical wage risk.
23. Impulse responses for the neutral technology shock and the wage markup shock can be found in
Online Appendix C.
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Fig 1. Impulse Responses to Price Markup Shock.
Note: Responses are measured in percentage deviations from steady state. Horizontal axes measure time in quarters.
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income, defined as the product of the real wage and hours worked, is almost fully
compensated. The increase in credit is enhanced by a falling borrowing interest rate.
As investment and hours worked rise, aggregate output also goes up when the price
markup shock hits the economy.
The outcome changes if we abstract from the relative consumption motive (dashed
lines). Now, the workers’ choice of consumption does not hinge on the investors
anymore. In this case, workers increase their labor supply by a smaller amount and
reduce their consumption expenditures. As a result, the drop in labor income is more
pronounced and output goes up to a lesser extent.
Consumption inequality rises in both scenarios but significantly less when the rel-
ative consumption motive is present. Income inequality is also strongly increasing
after a price markup shock, caused by large profits on the investors’ side while labor
income drops on impact and rises only moderately over time.
4.3 Investment-Specific Technology Shock
Figure 2 presents the model responses to an investment-specific technology shock.
In the unrestricted model (solid lines), investors shift their expenditures from con-
sumption to investment on impact, as the shock makes saving in capital more prof-
itable. Since workers imitate the consumption behavior of investors, they also de-
crease their consumption expenditures. This results in a reduced supply of hours
worked and a falling demand for credit. As credit falls, the interest rate goes up, al-
though not as much as the interest rate on deposits, so that the credit spread decreases
ultimately. The strong decrease in labor supply leads then to a fall in aggregate output
and profits, resulting in a significant decrease of investors’ income and their personal
expenditures. The negative responses of most aggregate variables is supported by
empirical evidence showing that investment-specific technology shocks have con-
tractionary effects (Basu et al. 2013).
The results change significantly when the consumption externality is switched off
(dashed lines). Working households now increase their labor supply and reduce their
credit demand by a smaller amount so that the reduction in consumption expenditures
is only marginal. Similarly, the investors’ consumption level drops less pronounced,
also due to an increase in profits. Consequently, the rise in investment is more per-
sistent and as both input factors increase also output goes up when the relative con-
sumption motive is absent.
Consumption inequality drops strongly as investors decrease their consumption
expenditures relatively more than workers in both scenarios. Income inequality, on
the other hand, decreases when the relative consumption motive is present and rises
otherwise. In the former case, investors experience a decline in profits and capital
income as the rental rate drops sharply. Since both types lose in terms of income
but the investors relatively more, income inequality decreases. In the other case, the
opposite is true. Both types’ income increases but investors gain relatively more so
that inequality in income increases slightly.
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Fig 2. Impulse Responses to Investment-Specific Technology Shock.
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5. ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we show that our results are robust when modifying the externality
such that it is based on lagged relative consumption. More specifically, we investigate
a catching up behavior instead of keeping up. In a second robustness exercise, we split
the sample and study whether the degree of upward looking comparison has changed
over time.24
5.1 Catching Up with the Riches
First, we adjust the reference point of workers in equation (23). Instead of assum-
ing that X enters contemporaneously, workers’ utility depends here on past relative
consumption.25 Thus, the workers’ utility function becomes
U (Cw,t,Xt−1,Nw,t ) =
(Cw,tX−bt−1)
1−σ − 1
1 − σ −
γN1+ηw,t





where b again determines the strength of the relative consumption motive. The fo-
cus on past relative consumption might be justified by the fact that agents need time
to observe and realize other agents’ consumption decisions, and to adjust their own
consumption expenditures. We run the same procedure as with our baseline speci-
fication, namely, estimate the vector of parameters θ∗ = {b, σ, φ, ρζ , σζ , ρν, σν} by
SMM. The upper part of Table 8 reports the estimated parameters for this specifica-
tion.
We find that the parameter governing the catching up preferences is positive and
significant, but somewhat smaller as for the keeping up preferences. Moreover, the
risk aversion parameter σ slightly increases. The remaining parameters are similar to
the baseline estimates.
The lower part of Table 8 reports the simulated moments in comparison to their
empirical counterparts. We find an overall good fit with this preference specifi-
cation as all of the targeted moments are in line with the data. In terms of the
nontargeted moments in columns 6–9, we detect a slightly different pattern com-
pared to our baseline case. The model with catching up preferences is able to repli-
cate the acyclicality of the real wage. This comes at the cost of a relatively lower
procyclicality of consumption, investment, and hours worked, and a much more
volatile real wage series such that wages are more than twice a volatile as in the
data.
24. Online Appendix D includes additional robustness exercises. In particular, we exclude parameter
σ from the estimation procedure, we investigate the sensitivity of our results with respect to the choice of
the inverse Frisch elasticity η. Additionally, we allow for different specifications of the externality Xt .
25. In analogy to Abel (1990), we call this catching up with the Riches.
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TABLE 8
Estimated Parameter Values With Catching Up Preferences
Parameter Value SD
Relative consumption motive b 0.8914 (0.0418)
Risk aversion parameter σ 4.6662 (0.0532)
Debt adjustment cost parameter φ 1.0948 (0.0187)
AR-coefficient inv.-specific technology shock ρζ 0.8460 (0.0301)
Standard deviation investment shock σζ 0.0098 (0.0005)
AR-coefficient wage markup shock ρν 0.6384 (0.1901)
Standard deviation wage markup shock σν 0.0193 (0.0033)
ρ(xt ,Dt ) σx/σD ρ(xt ,Yt ) σx/σY
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Output 0.1523 0.0847 0.4568 0.3041 - - - -
Consumption 0.1658 0.1465 0.2783 0.2955 0.8020 0.5083 0.6092 0.9729
Investment 0.0852 −0.0301 1.7524 1.2405 0.9061 0.6846 3.8359 4.0820
Hours worked 0.3603 0.4951 0.5080 0.5007 0.8144 0.3116 1.1120 1.6494
Real wage −0.3207 −0.5250 0.3994 0.6024 0.0023 0.0172 0.8743 1.9853
Note: ρ(xt ,Dt ) is the cross-correlation of variable xwith credit, σx/σD is the std. deviation of variable x relative to the std. deviation of credit,
ρ(xt ,Yt ) is the cross-correlation of variable x with output, σx/σY is the std. deviation of variable x relative to the std. deviation of output.
Consumer credit has been deflated using the price index of personal consumption expenditures. All variables are logged and HP-filtered
(smoothing parameter of 1600) to obtain cyclical components. For data definitions and sources, see Online Appendix A.
The intuition behind these results is the following. Consider the workers’ (log-
linearized) Euler equation abstracting from debt adjustment costs, given by
Ĉw,t+1 − (b(1 − σ ) + σ )
σ











As compared to Proposition 1, catching up preferences introduce an additional lagged
consumption term to the workers’ Euler equation. This is an additional internal habit
channel that simplifies consumption smoothing so that a lower b is necessary to get
the targeted moments.
The acyclicality of the real wage, on the other hand, is related to the estimated shock
parameters of both the investment-specific technology shock and the wage markup
shock. Both shocks induce a negative correlation between output and the real wage,
and since both have a smaller estimated standard deviation, this leads to a less nega-
tive correlation.
When comparing keeping up to catching up, we conclude that the lat-
ter are slightly inferior when it comes to matching second moments as the
keeping up preferences match 6 of 10 targets better and 5 of 8 nontargeted
moments.
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TABLE 9
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS AND SIMULATED MOMENTS FOR BOTH SUBSAMPLES
Parameter Full Pre-1990 Post-1990
Relative consumption motive b 2.9198 3.9235 1.7123
Risk aversion parameter σ 4.1754 5.0694 3.2040
Debt adjustment cost parameter φ 0.9961 1.0718 1.0295
AR-coefficient inv.-specific technology shock ρζ 0.9181 0.6317 0.9271
Standard deviation investment shock σζ 0.0102 0.0072 0.0112
AR-coefficient wage markup shock ρν 0.6080 0.1641 0.4779
Standard deviation wage markup shock σν 0.0281 0.0133 0.0227
Pre-1990 Post-1990
ρ(xt ,Dt ) σx/σD ρ(xt ,Dt ) σx/σD
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Output 0.3527 0.3755 0.4578 0.2983 0.0081 −0.0091 0.4599 0.3519
Consumption 0.4758 0.4385 0.2118 0.2197 0.0136 0.0667 0.3084 0.3346
Investment 0.2815 0.1443 2.0085 1.1565 −0.0809 −0.0814 1.6207 1.1725
Hours worked 0.4485 0.7032 0.4691 0.5657 0.2944 0.3756 0.5325 0.5483
Real wage 0.1653 −0.6718 0.3599 0.5917 −0.5527 −0.5634 0.4290 0.5520
Pre-1990 Post-1990
ρ(xt ,Yt ) σx/σY ρ(xt ,Yt ) σx/σY
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Consumption 0.6915 0.5252 0.4625 0.7368 0.8516 0.6824 0.6706 0.9509
Investment 0.9116 0.8188 4.3870 3.8777 0.9088 0.6728 3.5239 3.3358
Hours worked 0.8468 0.5163 1.0246 1.8974 0.7950 0.5524 1.1578 1.5605
Real wage −0.4901 −0.2849 0.7860 1.9846 0.2278 −0.1038 0.9327 1.5727
Note: ρ(xt ,Dt ) is the cross-correlation of variable xwith credit, σx/σD is the std. deviation of variable x relative to the std. deviation of credit.
ρ(xt ,Yt ) is the cross-correlation of variable x with output, σx/σY is the std. deviation of variable x relative to the std. deviation of output.
5.2 Split-Sample Estimation
As a final check, we test whether our findings are robust when splitting the sample.
As shown by Fieldhouse, Livshits, andMacGee (2016) the cyclical behavior of credit
has shifted during the early 1990s. As Table 9 reports, we indeed find a change in the
cyclicality of consumer credit. In particular, we split the full sample into one pre-1990
and one post-1990 sample and find that credit is strongly procyclical in the first part
of the sample, whereas it turns mainly acyclical thereafter. This result might suggest
that also the strength of the keeping up mechanism has changed over time.
To investigate this issue, we estimate our model parameters for both subsamples.
As expected, the size of the relative consumption motive is much stronger in the pre-
1990 sample than in the post-1990 sample. The parameter is estimated to be more
than twice as large in the first subsample. However, also in the second subsample,
we find a positive value for b, which indicates that relative consumption concerns
are still an important determinant of credit dynamics in the more recent part of the
sample. For both subsamples, the model produces credit dynamics that show only
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minor discrepancies compared to the empirical ones. Moreover, the nontargeted out-
put moments match the observed ones fairly closely pre- and post-1990. Overall, we
conclude that, while the strength of the relative consumption motive has decreased
over time, our estimation on the more recent past still strongly speaks in favor of
consumption externalities.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we set up a DSGE model that mimics the short-run dynamics of
consumer credit for the period of the Great Moderation. The model consists of two
different household types. Investors, who hold the economy’s entire capital stock,
own the firms and supply credit, and workers who make up the entire labor force and
demand credit to finance their desired level of consumption. In addition, we incorpo-
rate a keeping up with the Richesmechanism so that workers aim to keep up with the
investors’ level of consumption.
When estimating deep model parameters, we find a positive significant value for
the workers’ keeping up parameter. Qualitatively, an income redistribution from labor
to capital and an investment-specific technology shock lead to model dynamics that
are perfectly in line with the empirical evidence. More precisely, both shocks gen-
erate positive correlations of consumer credit with output, consumption, and labor,
while there is a negative comovement between consumer credit and the real wage. In
contrast, a neutral technology shock and a wage markup shock are not able to gen-
erate the positive correlations between consumer credit, output, and consumption. In
reproducing empirical credit moments, the proposed model significantly outperforms
a model version in which consumption externalities are not included. Complemen-
tary to microevidence (Bertrand and Morse 2016), we have provided macroevidence
on the link between income redistribution, consumption externalities, and credit dy-
namics.
We think that a potential promising area of future research lies in extending our
proposed model by strategic default. In particular, combining incomplete markets
and default on unsecured credit as studied by Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007),
Chatterjee et al. (2007) with relative consumption concerns might provide important
insights in terms of business cycle fluctuations and welfare costs that are of great
interest not only for the research community but also for policymakers.
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